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The EU is undermining its own foreign policy by refusing to
act as strongly in the diplomatic arena as its competitors.
by Blog Admin
The EU has long aspired to be a major player in global affairs. Despite having considerable
diplomatic resources, however, Daniel C. Thomas argues that the organisation consistently
punches below its weight in negotiations. Using disputes over the International Criminal Court
as a case study, he concludes that even when there is a high degree of unity between member
states, the EU is often undercut by countries such as the United States who are willing to act
more forcefully in the diplomatic arena.
As the European Union grapples with its most severe internal crisis since the Treaty of
Rome was signed f if ty- f ive years ago, it may seem odd to worry about the ef f ectiveness of  EU f oreign
policy. But despite the Eurozone crisis, the Union as a whole has long aspired to shape world order in line
with its stated goals of  ef f ective multilateralism, the promotion of  democracy and human rights, and
sustainable economic development. Moreover, f rom the shattered streets of  Aleppo to the hallowed halls
of  the United Nations, other actors have called on the EU to play a global role commensurate with its
collective weight (27 member states with 500 million cit izens and 2 UN Security Council vetoes, the world’s
largest market and f oreign aid budget).
The question thus arises whether the EU is really doing its best in this regard. My recent research suggests
that the EU is signif icantly less ef f ective than its collective weight would lead one to expect. The
explanation f or this lack of  ef f ectiveness seems to lie to a disturbing degree in the EU’s self - imposed
reluctance to mobilise its considerable resources in support of  its own collective f oreign policy goals. And I
don’t mean military resources, which are admittedly dif f icult f or the EU to deploy abroad, f or a variety of
reasons.
I decided to probe the conventional assumption (of ten heard in Brussels) that the EU will be ef f ective when
it acts in a coherent manner.  As the EU Council declared in 2000, “reinf orcing the coherence of  the Union’s
external action and realising its policy objectives are priorit ies if  the Union is to pull its f ull weight in
international af f airs.” But is this coherence-ef f ectiveness argument truly valid? Despite the pervasiveness
of  commentary on this issue, f ew scholars have addressed it in a systematic empirical f ashion.
To start, I developed a simple def init ion of  EU coherence: the adoption of  determinate common policies and
the pursuit of  those policies by EU member states and institutions. The f irst dimension, policy determinacy,
ref lects how clearly a policy adopted by the EU articulates the Union’s goals and how narrowly it specif ies
the behaviours incumbent upon EU member states and institutions in order to achieve those goals. The
second dimension, polit ical cohesion, ref lects how f ully EU actors support whatever common policy has
been agreed. EU coherence is thus greatest on any given issue when it belongs in the upper-right corner of
the f ollowing two-dimensional space:
As indicated above, the conventional wisdom asserts that
greater EU coherence will yield greater EU ef f ectiveness. To
test this claim, I def ine EU ef f ectiveness simply as the Union’s
ability to shape world af f airs in accordance with the objectives
it adopts on particular issues. These objectives could take
many f orms, including achieving certain material or
environmental gains, promoting respect f or certain values,
shaping international institutions in a certain way, aiding a
particular state, or shaping the outcome of  a particular
conf lict.
To test the relationship between coherence and
ef f ectiveness, I examined the EU’s global conf rontation with
the United States over the jurisdiction of  the International
Criminal Court (ICC) during the period 2002-2007. In particular,
I f ocused on the success of  the EU’s ef f orts to resist the
United States’ of f icial campaign to sign bilateral non-
surrender agreements (BNAs) with other governments around the world. In-depth study of  this case yields
important lessons f or the broader challenge of  EU f oreign policy ef f ectiveness.
The American BNAs were designed to ensure that no U.S. cit izens, government of f icials, military personnel
or other employees would ever be transf erred to the ICC. But they were draf ted to be reciprocal: they would
also shield persons f rom the other signatory state f rom transf er to the ICC. BNAs would thus undermine
the ef f ectiveness of  the ICC as a deterrent to mass atrocit ies and violate the compliance obligations of
those states that were party to the Rome Statute. And if  other states f ollowed the US lead and launched
their own BNA campaigns, a web of  bilateral agreements ef f ectively neutering the ambitions of  the ICC
would soon cover the world. As such, BNAs were a direct threat to the EU’s f ormal commitment to support
the good f unctioning of  the Court and respect f or the Rome Statute that created it.
Contrary to the expectations of  those who ridicule the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU actually
exhibited considerable coherence on this high prof ile and potentially sensit ive f oreign policy issue. In the
autumn of  2002, the member states agreed to resist any measures that would undermine the Court,
including implicit ly the agreements being promoted by Washington. Even though some of  the EU’s member
states pref erred to accommodate Washington’s demands, they all complied with the EU posit ion.
Meanwhile, the European Commission and Council presidency launched diplomatic démarches (a f ormal
statement of  pref erences or values) in an ef f ort to persuade other governments to reject the American
BNAs.
Unf ortunately f or those who want the EU to be an inf luential actor in world af f airs, my research shows that
the Union’s coherence on this issue was not translated into ef f ectiveness at the global level. Of  the 102
states that signed bilateral ICC non-surrender agreements with the United States between August 2002 and
April 2007, 89 of  these agreements were signed af ter the EU guidelines were adopted. Of  the 53 states
that received EU démarches, 42 per cent did not sign any BNA, 6 per cent signed non-reciprocal BNAs, and
47 per cent signed reciprocal BNAs. In contrast, of  the 138 states that did not receive an EU démarche –
and thus might be expected to sign more BNAs and more reciprocal BNAs – the data show that 49 per cent
did not sign any BNA, 12 per cent signed non-reciprocal BNAs, and 38 per cent signed reciprocal BNAs. If
we f ocus on outcomes that are clearly inconsistent with the EU guidelines, we see that 47 per cent of
states that received an EU démarche went on to sign a reciprocal BNA, while only 38 per cent of  states that
did not receive an EU démarche did so – presumably the opposite of  what the démarches were intended to
accomplish.
Moreover, a stunning 47 per cent of  the ICC states that received démarches went on to sign reciprocal
BNAs (which the EU guidelines clearly sought to prevent), while only 15 per cent of  the ICC states that did
not receive démarches signed non-reciprocal BNAs. Similarly, 47 per cent of  non-states-party that received
démarches ref used to sign BNAs, while only 39 per cent of  ICC states that received démarches ref used to
sign BNAs. It is also interesting to note that if  we f ocus on those who received a démarche, the same
proportion (47 per cent) of  states with and without legal obligations to the Rome Statute went on to sign
reciprocal BNAs, which suggests that the EU’s specif ic ef f ort to f rame the BNA issue in terms of  legal
obligations was as inef f ective as its general ef f ort to counter the U.S. campaign. In short, the EU f ailed to
convert its coherence into inf luence over outcomes, which is what really matters.
The explanation f or this f ailure, my research suggests, is very simple: the EU was not willing to put much of
its collective diplomatic muscle behind its anti-BNA campaign. This stood in stark contrast to the willingness
of  the US to threaten immediate cut-of f s of  military and economic assistance to states that ref used to
sign a BNA. For example, af ter the U.S. cut military aid to six Caribbean states that ref used to sign a BNA,
the president of  Guyana explained his decision to sign: “The U.S. has made it clear that they will cut of f  the
aid. I need the military co-operation with the U.S. to continue. It is as clear as that. I can’t be more clear.”
Even if  the EU was not willing to condition its economic aid on compliance with its view of  BNAs, it could
have f ound other ways to reduce other states’ vulnerability to the US threats. But it chose not to do so.
This case demonstrates that the EU’s much-vaunted “normative power” is an unreliable basis f or ef f ective
action in world af f airs. Other actors of ten have policy pref erences that dif f er signif icantly f rom those of
the EU and are willing to commit material resources in support of  their pref erences. Unless and until the EU
does the same, it will have litt le ef f ect on the world order of  the 21st century.
For a longer fully-documented version of the article see Thomas, Daniel C. (2012). Still Punching Below its
Weight? Coherence and Ef f ectiveness in European Union Foreign Policy. Journal of Common Market
Studies, 50:3 (May), 457-474.
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